Unlike the effects of accidental injury or disease, research on the effects of crime has stressed mental, psychological and social effects, in contrast to physical or financial effects.
This is attributable to the fact that crime is "qualitatively different from being the victim of an accident or disease, because it includes someone deliberately or recklessly harming you" Shapland and Hall, , p. For the sake of completeness, both the potential physical and psychological consequences of terrorism are highlighted here.
See e. The physical consequences of terrorism-related acts and violations can include broken bones, soft tissue injuries, disability, long-term, chronic pain and sensory disturbance. Victims may experience visceral symptoms, including cardiovascular and respiratory difficulties, intestinal and urological problems and genital complaints IRCT, a , Part C, sects. I, II and VI.
They may also suffer somatic symptoms, including headaches and back pain Hoge, Where abuses have included rape or other forms of sexual violence, survivors may also experience gynaecological, rectal and internal haemorrhaging Tompkins, , p. Medical consequences can include the contraction of sexually transmitted disease including HIV and other chronic infections, cervical cancer directly linked to HPV, or Genital Human Papilloma Virus infection, see Ghoborah, Huth and Russet, pp.
At a psychological level, trauma can engender "a metamorphosis of the psyche… mental decomposition and collapse" Vinar, , p. This in turn can affect a survivor's sense of self Kira, , p. Man-made trauma, such as that associated with terrorism, can shatter core beliefs, including belief in the world as a just place 'the existential dilemma' Herlihy and Turner, , p.
Survivors of terrorist acts - such as hostage taking, hijacking or kidnapping - may experience fear, shock, anxiety, shame, guilt and self-blame, anger, hostility, rage and resentment Schmid, , p. Survivors may also suffer grief for the loss of others and the self, anxiety, depression including suicidal ideation , emotional numbness and difficulties in recollection Brewin, , pp.
Some victims may also experience post-traumatic stress disorder PTSD which, in addition to depressive symptoms, may also include intrusive phenomena such as flashbacks and nightmares, and which may persist for months or years Shapland and Hall, , p. Others criticize the diagnosis because it does not reflect the political, societal or cultural context of abuse suffered by victims Herman, , pp.
For others still, PTSD is the 'medicalization' of what they understand to be a natural response to a deeply traumatic experience Becker, Research conducted on the effect of terrorist attacks on victims has revealed that acts of terrorist violence often produce high proportions of significantly affected victims, i. Similarly, a study conducted by Bleich et al. It was found that the level of exposure and objective risk of an attack were not related to stress Erez, , p.
One explanation for this is that any victim of crime may suffer consequential effects as a response, which includes "changes in perceived risk of future victimisation" Shapland and Hall, , p. As Schmid has observed, "[t]he degree of terror as well as the resilience of the individual survivor play a role [in the degree of symptoms experienced as a result of terrorist attacks.
Where abuse has included forms of sexual violence, survivors may also experience sexual dysfunction, fear of intimacy, self-loathing and rejection of their body, which in turn can engender self-injurious behaviour Yohani and Hagen, , pp. In addition to the psychological impact of terrorism-related violations experienced at an individual level, affected societies may suffer collective trauma which is particularly the case where attacks are targeted against a particular group or community.
See Alexander, , who explores the development of social and cultural trauma; see also Weine, , p. In such a situation, the sense of group identity and allegiance is heightened Aroche and Coello, , p. Because of that heightened allegiance, when the group, or members of it, are attacked, it may collectively experience symptoms of psychological trauma De Jong, , p.
Manifestations of trauma at a societal level can include varying forms of community dysfunction. Abuses such as torture or ethnically-targeted violence may create "an order based on imminent pervasive threat, fear, terror, and inhibition,… a state of generalized insecurity, terror, lack of confidence, and rupture of the social fabric" Lecic and Bakalic, , p.
Societies that witness the perpetration of atrocities such as war rape and other forms of violence against community and family members may experience severe trauma Hagen and Yohani, , p. Collectively, communities enter into shock, which is compounded by grief for the loss of the victim through either death, the debilitating physical and psychological impact of the violation, or, in the case of rape, familial and community rejection Yohani and Hagen, , pp.
Whilst the perpetration of atrocities can generate trauma at the individual and societal levels, the respective nature of individual and collective trauma may differ. Individual and collective trauma reactions can be influenced by factors such as the specific targeting of abuse and the duration or intensity of the stressor. These factors in turn affect the degree of life threat - i.
In particular, individually-targeted violations are more likely to represent a threat of imminent death than a repressive, longer-term and chronic stressor targeted at a specific community Modvig and Jaranson, , p.
Notably, while mass conflict or a prevailing threat of terrorist attack is recognized as having a widespread, psychological impact upon society, its effects will not necessarily be uniform, but will be dependent upon the extent to which specific groups were affected Aroche and Coello, , p.
Far from being conceptualized discretely, however, individual and societal forms of trauma are understood as interlinked and interdependent trauma responses. Gross violations of human rights can affect the individual not only as an individual per se , but also as a member of a community or of society more generally. In particular, community or societal allegiance or affiliation, as aspects of social and cultural identity, form part of the individual's personal identity system.
Clinical literature describes a 'layering' of trauma, reflecting to some extent the 'victimization circles' referred to above, such that an individual, as a member of a particular group or of society more broadly, may experience the first phase of the traumatisation process with the onset or increase in group repression or persecution which may include elements of social and political change.
Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its methodology. Americans were enraged by the attacks, too. Fear was widespread, not just in the days immediately after the attacks, but throughout the fall of When asked a year later to describe how their lives changed in a major way, about half of adults said they felt more afraid, more careful, more distrustful or more vulnerable as a result of the attacks.
This sentiment was shared by residents of other large cities. A quarter of people who lived in large cities nationwide said their lives had changed in a major way — twice the rate found in small towns and rural areas.
The impacts of the Sept. By the following August, half of U. The study noted that while partisans agreed on little else that election cycle, more than seven-in-ten Republicans and Democrats named the attacks as one of their top 10 historic events. It is difficult to think of an event that so profoundly transformed U. While Americans had a shared sense of anguish after Sept. After the U. George W. Bush, who had become president nine months earlier after a fiercely contested election, saw his job approval rise 35 percentage points in the space of three weeks.
Americans also turned to religion and faith in large numbers. Public esteem rose even for some institutions that usually are not that popular with Americans. For example, in November , news organizations received record-high ratings for professionalism.
Public trust in government, as well as confidence in other institutions, declined throughout the s. With the U. Many Americans were impatient for the Bush administration to give the go-ahead for military action. Even in the early stages of the U. Throughout the fall of , more Americans said the best way to prevent future terrorism was to take military action abroad rather than build up defenses at home.
Initially, the public was confident that the U. Support for the war in Afghanistan continued at a high level for several years to come.
Only two-in-ten said it was the wrong decision. The share favoring a speedy troop withdrawal increased over the next few years. Recommendation: The United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. There are several multilateral institutions in which such issues should be addressed. But the most important policies should be discussed and coordinated in a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments.
This is a good place, for example, to develop joint strategies for targeting terrorist travel, or for hammering out a common strategy for the places where terrorists may be finding sanctuary. Presently the Muslim and Arab states meet with each other, in organizations such as the Islamic Conference and the Arab League.
A recent G-8 summit initiative to begin a dialogue about reform may be a start toward finding a place where leading Muslim states can discuss-and be seen to discuss-critical policy issues with the leading Western powers committed to the future of the Arab and Muslim world. These new international efforts can create durable habits of visible cooperation, as states willing to step up to their responsibilities join together in constructive efforts to direct assistance and coordinate action.
Coalition warfare also requires coalition policies on what to do with enemy captives. Allegations that the United States abused prisoners in its custody make it harder to build the diplomatic, political, and military alliances the government will need. The United States should work with friends to develop mutually agreed-on principles for the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists who are not being held under a particular country's criminal laws.
Countries such as Britain, Australia, and Muslim friends, are committed to fighting terrorists. America should be able to reconcile its views on how to balance humanity and security with our nation's commitment to these same goals. The United States and some of its allies do not accept the application of full Geneva Convention treatment of prisoners of war to captured terrorists. Those Conventions establish a minimum set of standards for prisoners in internal conflicts. Since the international struggle against Islamist terrorism is not internal, those provisions do not formally apply, but they are commonly accepted as basic standards for humane treatment.
Recommendation: The United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. New principles might draw upon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict.
That article was specifically designed for those cases in which the usual laws of war did not apply. Its minimum standards are generally accepted throughout the world as customary international law. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons. As we note in chapter 2, al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years.
In chapter 4, we mentioned officials worriedly discussing, in , reports that Bin Ladin's associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a "Hiroshima. In the public portion of his February worldwide threat assessment to Congress, DCI Tenet noted that Bin Ladin considered the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a "religious obligation.
A trained nuclear engineer with an amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a grapefruit or an orange, together with commercially available material, could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in Such a bomb would level Lower Manhattan.
We recommend several initiatives in this area. Strengthen Counterproliferation Efforts. While efforts to shut down Libya's illegal nuclear program have been generally successful, Pakistan's illicit trade and the nuclear smuggling networks of Pakistani scientist A. Khan have revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global dimensions. Attempts to deal with Iran's nuclear program are still underway. Therefore, the United States should work with the international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of such smugglers by any state in the world where they do not disclose their activities.
Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative. In May , the Bush administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative PSI : nations in a willing partnership combining their national capabilities to use military, economic, and diplomatic tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related technology. Russia and China should be encouraged to participate.
Support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Outside experts are deeply worried about the U. The government's main instrument in this area, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program usually referred to as "Nunn-Lugar," after the senators who sponsored the legislation in , is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources.
The government should weigh the value of this investment against the catastrophic cost America would face should such weapons find their way to the terrorists who are so anxious to acquire them. Recommendation: Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort-by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
Targeting Terrorist Money The general public sees attacks on terrorist finance as a way to "starve the terrorists of money. These actions appeared to have little effect and, when confronted by legal challenges, the United States and the United Nations were often forced to unfreeze assets.
The difficulty, understood later, was that even if the intelligence community might "link" someone to a terrorist group through acquaintances or communications, the task of tracing the money from that individual to the terrorist group, or otherwise showing complicity, was far more difficult.
It was harder still to do so without disclosing secrets. These early missteps made other countries unwilling to freeze assets or otherwise act merely on the basis of a U. Multilateral freezing mechanisms now require waiting periods before being put into effect, eliminating the element of surprise and thus virtually ensuring that little money is actually frozen.
Worldwide asset freezes have not been adequately enforced and have been easily circumvented, often within weeks, by simple methods. But trying to starve the terrorists of money is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean.
A better strategy has evolved since those early months, as the government learned more about how al Qaeda raises, moves, and spends money. Recommendation: Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.
The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators-individuals al Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money-at the core of al Qaeda's revenue stream. These efforts have worked.
The death or capture of several important facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and moving that money. Captures have additionally provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption.
Obvious vulnerabilities in the U. The United States has been less successful in persuading other countries to adopt financial regulations that would permit the tracing of financial transactions.
Public designation of terrorist financiers and organizations is still part of the fight, but it is not the primary weapon. Designations are instead a form of diplomacy, as governments join together to identify named individuals and groups as terrorists. They also prevent open fundraising. Some charities that have been identified as likely avenues for terrorist financing have seen their donations diminish and their activities come under more scrutiny, and others have been put out of business, although controlling overseas branches of Gulf-area charities remains a challenge.
The Saudi crackdown after the May terrorist attacks in Riyadh has apparently reduced the funds available to al Qaeda-per-haps drastically-but it is too soon to know if this reduction will last.
Though progress apparently has been made, terrorists have shown considerable creativity in their methods of moving money. If al Qaeda is replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind the government's efforts-that terrorists need a financial support network-may become outdated.
Moreover, some terrorist operations do not rely on outside sources of money and may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment or low-level criminal activity. Some of the changes are due to government action, such as new precautions to protect aircraft. A portion can be attributed to the sheer scale of spending and effort. Publicity and the vigilance of ordinary Americans also make a difference. But the President and other officials acknowledge that although Americans may be safer, they are not safe.
Our report shows that the terrorists analyze defenses. They plan accordingly. Defenses cannot achieve perfect safety. They make targets harder to attack successfully, and they deter attacks by making capture more likely. Just increasing the attacker's odds of failure may make the difference between a plan attempted, or a plan discarded.
The enemy also may have to develop more elaborate plans, thereby increasing the danger of exposure or defeat. Protective measures also prepare for the attacks that may get through, containing the damage and saving lives. Terrorist Travel More than million people annually cross U.
Another , or more enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands of miles of land borders or remain in the country past the expiration of their permitted stay.
The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.
Public figures voiced concern about the "war on drugs," the right level and kind of immigration, problems along the southwest border, migration crises originating in the Caribbean and elsewhere, or the growing criminal traffic in humans.
The immigration system as a whole was widely viewed as increasingly dysfunctional and badly in need of reform. In national security circles, however, only smuggling of weapons of mass destruction carried weight, not the entry of terrorists who might use such weapons or the presence of associated foreign-born terrorists.
For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points. In their travels, terrorists use evasive methods, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud.
These can sometimes be detected. Had they done so, they could have discovered the ways in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been systematically but detectably exploiting weaknesses in our border security since the early s. We found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers and more effective use of information available in U.
Because they were deemed not to be bona fide tourists or students as they claimed, five conspirators that we know of tried to get visas and failed, and one was denied entry by an inspector. We also found that had the immigration system set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what they claim to be-and ensuring routine consequences for violations-it could potentially have excluded, removed, or come into further contact with several hijackers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.
These weaknesses have been reduced but are far from being overcome. Recommendation: Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.
However, in the already difficult process of merging border agencies in the new Department of Homeland Security-"changing the engine while flying" as one official put it 34 -new insights into terrorist travel have not yet been integrated into the front lines of border security. The small terrorist travel intelligence collection and analysis program currently in place has produced disproportionately useful results. It should be expanded. Since officials at the borders encounter travelers and their documents first and investigate travel facilitators, they must work closely with intelligence officials.
Internationally and in the United States, constraining terrorist travel should become a vital part of counterterrorism strategy. Better technology and training to detect terrorist travel documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's vulnerability to clandestine entry. Every stage of our border and immigration system should have as a part of its operations the detection of terrorist indicators on travel documents. Information systems able to authenticate travel documents and detect potential terrorist indicators should be used at consulates, at primary border inspection lines, in immigration services offices, and in intelligence and enforcement units.
All frontline personnel should receive some training. Dedicated specialists and ongoing linkages with the intelligence community are also required.
The Homeland Security Department's Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection should receive more resources to accomplish its mission as the bridge between the frontline border agencies and the rest of the government counterterrorism community. A Biometric Screening System When people travel internationally, they usually move through defined channels, or portals. They may seek to acquire a passport. They may apply for a visa. They stop at ticket counters, gates, and exit controls at airports and seaports.
Upon arrival, they pass through inspection points. They may transit to another gate to get on an airplane. Once inside the country, they may seek another form of identification and try to enter a government or private facility.
They may seek to change immigration status in order to remain. Each of these checkpoints or portals is a screening-a chance to establish that people are who they say they are and are seeking access for their stated purpose, to intercept identifiable suspects, and to take effective action. The job of protection is shared among these many defined checkpoints.
By taking advantage of them all, we need not depend on any one point in the system to do the whole job. The challenge is to see the common problem across agencies and functions and develop a conceptual framework-an architecture-for an effective screening system.
These problems should be addressed systemically, not in an ad hoc, fragmented way. For example: What information is an individual required to present and in what form? A fundamental problem, now beginning to be addressed, is the lack of standardized information in "feeder" documents used in identifying individuals. Biometric identifiers that measure unique physical characteristics, such as facial features, fingerprints, or iris scans, and reduce them to digitized, numerical statements called algorithms, are just beginning to be used.
Travel history, however, is still recorded in passports with entry-exit stamps called cachets, which al Qaeda has trained its operatives to forge and use to conceal their terrorist activities. How will the individual and the information be checked? There are many databases just in the United States-for terrorist, criminal, and immigration history, as well as financial information, for instance.
Each is set up for different purposes and stores different kinds of data, under varying rules of access. Nor is access always guaranteed.
Acquiring information held by foreign governments may require painstaking negotiations, and records that are not yet digitized are difficult to search or analyze. The development of terrorist indicators has hardly begun, and behavioral cues remain important. Who will screen individuals, and what will they be trained to do?
A wide range of border, immigration, and law enforcement officials encounter visitors and immigrants and they are given little training in terrorist travel intelligence. Fraudulent travel documents, for instance, are usually returned to travelers who are denied entry without further examination for terrorist trademarks, investigation as to their source, or legal process.
What are the consequences of finding a suspicious indicator, and who will take action? One risk is that responses may be ineffective or produce no further information. More than half of the 19 hijackers were flagged by the Federal Aviation Administration's profiling system when they arrived for their flights, but the consequence was that bags, not people, were checked.
Competing risks include "false positives," or the danger that rules may be applied with insufficient training or judgment. Overreactions can impose high costs too-on individuals, our economy, and our beliefs about justice.
A special note on the importance of trusting subjective judgment: One potential hijacker was turned back by an immigration inspector as he tried to enter the United States. The inspector relied on intuitive experience to ask questions more than he relied on any objective factor that could be detected by "scores" or a machine. Good people who have worked in such jobs for a long time understand this phenomenon well. Other evidence we obtained confirmed the importance of letting experienced gate agents or security screeners ask questions and use their judgment.
This is not an invitation to arbitrary exclusions. But any effective system has to grant some scope, perhaps in a little extra inspection or one more check, to the instincts and discretion of well trained human beings. The President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with systemwide goals in mind. Extending those standards among other governments could dramatically strengthen America and the world's collective ability to intercept individuals who pose catastrophic threats.
We advocate a system for screening, not categorical profiling. A screening system looks for particular, identifiable suspects or indicators of risk. It does not involve guesswork about who might be dangerous. It requires frontline border officials who have the tools and resources to establish that people are who they say they are, intercept identifiable suspects, and disrupt terrorist operations.
Border Screening System The border and immigration system of the United States must remain a visible manifestation of our belief in freedom, democracy, global economic growth, and the rule of law, yet serve equally well as a vital element of counterterrorism. Integrating terrorist travel information in the ways we have described is the most immediate need.
But the underlying system must also be sound. It takes two biometric identifiers-digital photographs and prints of two index fingers-from travelers. False identities are used by terrorists to avoid being detected on a watchlist. These biometric identifiers make such evasions far more difficult.
So far, however, only visitors who acquire visas to travel to the United States are covered. While visitors from "visa waiver" countries will be added to the program, beginning this year, covered travelers will still constitute only about 12 percent of all noncitizens crossing U. Moreover, exit data are not uniformly collected and entry data are not fully automated. It is not clear the system can be installed before , but even this timetable may be too slow, given the possible security dangers.
Currently U. The current system enables non-U. To balance this measure, programs to speed known travelers should be a higher priority, permitting inspectors to focus on greater risks. The daily commuter should not be subject to the same measures as first-time travelers. An individual should be able to preenroll, with his or her identity verified in passage. Updates of database information and other checks can ensure ongoing reliability. The solution, requiring more research and development, is likely to combine radio frequency technology with biometric identifiers.
The program allowing individuals to travel from foreign countries through the United States to a third country, without having to obtain a U. Because "transit without visa" can be exploited by terrorists to enter the United States, the program should not be reinstated unless and until transit passage areas can be fully secured to prevent passengers from illegally exiting the airport.
All points in the border system-from consular offices to immigration services offices-will need appropriate electronic access to an individual's file. Scattered units at Homeland Security and the State Department perform screening and data mining: instead, a government-wide team of border and transportation officials should be working together.
A modern border and immigration system should combine a biometric entry-exit system with accessible files on visitors and immigrants, along with intelligence on indicators of terrorist travel. Our border screening system should check people efficiently and welcome friends. Admitting large numbers of students, scholars, businesspeople, and tourists fuels our economy, cultural vitality, and political reach.
There is evidence that the present system is disrupting travel to the United States. Overall, visa applications in were down over 32 percent since In the Middle East, they declined about 46 percent. Training and the design of security measures should be continuously adjusted. It should be integrated with the system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States.
Linking biometric passports to good data systems and decisionmaking is a fundamental goal. No one can hide his or her debt by acquiring a credit card with a slightly different name. Yet today, a terrorist can defeat the link to electronic records by tossing away an old passport and slightly altering the name in the new one. Completion of the entry-exit system is a major and expensive challenge. Biometrics have been introduced into an antiquated computer environment.
Replacement of these systems and improved biometric systems will be required. Nonetheless, funding and completing a biometrics-based entry-exit system is an essential investment in our national security. Exchanging terrorist information with other countries, consistent with privacy requirements, along with listings of lost and stolen passports, will have immediate security benefits. We should move toward real-time verification of passports with issuing authorities.
The further away from our borders that screening occurs, the more security benefits we gain. At least some screening should occur before a passenger departs on a flight destined for the United States. We should also work with other countries to ensure effective inspection regimes at all airports.
The global standard for identification is a digital photograph; fingerprints are optional. We must work with others to improve passport standards and provide foreign assistance to countries that need help in making the transition. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U. Immigration Law and Enforcement Our borders and immigration system, including law enforcement, ought to send a message of welcome, tolerance, and justice to members of immigrant communities in the United States and in their countries of origin.
We should reach out to immigrant communities. Good immigration services are one way of doing so that is valuable in every way-including intelligence. It is elemental to border security to know who is coming into the country. Today more than 9 million people are in the United States outside the legal immigration system. We must also be able to monitor and respond to entrances between our ports of entry, working with Canada and Mexico as much as possible.
There is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies. They need more training and work with federal agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities in identifying terrorist suspects. Acquisition of these forms of identification would have assisted them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other necessary activities. Recommendation: Secure identification should begin in the United States.
The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.
There are hundreds of commercial airports, thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of daily flights carrying more than half a billion passengers a year.
Millions of containers are imported annually through more than sea and river ports served by more than 3, cargo and passenger terminals. About 6, agencies provide transit services through buses, subways, ferries, and light-rail service to about 14 million Americans each weekday. These laws required the development of strategic plans to describe how the new department and TSA would provide security for critical parts of the U.
The money has been spent mainly to meet congressional mandates to federalize the security checkpoint screeners and to deploy existing security methods and technologies at airports.
The current efforts do not yet reflect a forward-looking strategic plan systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs, and benefits. Lacking such a plan, we are not convinced that our transportation security resources are being allocated to the greatest risks in a cost-effective way. Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security.
These, together with inadequate screening and access controls, continue to present aviation security challenges. While commercial aviation remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes.
Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation. Initiatives to secure shipping containers have just begun. Surface transportation systems such as railroads and mass transit remain hard to protect because they are so accessible and extensive.
Despite congressional deadlines, the TSA has developed neither an integrated strategic plan for the transportation sector nor specific plans for the various modes-air, sea, and ground. Recommendation: Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities federal, state, regional, and local and to private stakeholders.
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